The semantic priming task is a valuable tool in the investigation of semantic memory impairments in patients with acquired disorders of language. This is because priming performance reflects automatic or implicit access to semantic information, unlike most other tests of semantic knowledge, which rely on explicit, voluntary access. Priming results are important for two main reasons: First, normal priming results may be observed in patients who perform poorly on other semantic memory tests, enabling us to distinguish between loss of, or damage to, information in semantic memory, and voluntary access to that information. Second, we can investigate the detailed pattern of loss and preservation of different types of semantic infomation, by charting the priming effects for different kinds of words, and different kinds of semantic relations between primes and targets.
INTRODUCTION
Impairments of semantic memory-+ur long-term store of conceptual knowledge about the meanings of words, as well as about objects and events in the world-have been reported for patients with a variety of acquired disorders of language. Semantic memory impairments are commonly accompanied by other 1992; Huff, Corkin, & Growden, 1986) . In other cases, semantic memory can be affected with relatively little damage to other linguistic and cognitive functions, most notably in patients with semantic dementia (Hodges, Patterson, Oxbury, & Funnell, 1992; Schwartz, Marin, & Saffran, 1979; Snowden, Goulding, & Neary, 1989; Warrington, 1975) .
Semantic memory impairments have generated a great deal of interest in cognitive neuropsychology because of the light that the nature of impairments may shed on the organisation of the semantic store, and on the content and structure of semantic representations. For example, the apparent existence of selective impairments of knowledge about specific semantic categories, such as living things, artifacts, or even just fruit and vegetables, has been seen as evidence that semantic memory is highly structured according to these different content domains (e.g. Sachett & Humphreys, 1992; Warrington & McCarthy, 1987; Warrington & Shallice, 1984) , and modality-specific semantic impairments have been taken as evidence for multiple semantic systems (Shallice, 1988a, b; Warrington, 1975) . These kinds of claims continue to generate lively debate, and several alternative accounts have been put forward (e.g. Funnell & Sheridan, 1992; Riddoch, Humphreys, Coltheart, & Funnell, 1988) .
A central problem in the interpretation of semantic memory impairments is that it is often difficult to be certain that a patient's performance reflects a true disorder of semantic memory-that is, loss or disruption of stored representations-rather than problems involving the access or retrieval of this information. Most tasks designed to probe the nature of semantic memory cannot distinguish between central semantic storage impairments and disorders of voluntary access to semantic information. This is because, as well as involving stored semantic knowledge, such tasks require an additional element-voluntary access or retrieval of that knowledge. For example, in order to sort pictures into category groups, a person must not only know which pictured objects belong to the same category, but they must also be able to retrieve the appropriate information, under voluntary control, when required to do so by the experimenter. The possibility that patients may have problems with the voluntary access of semantic information makes it more difficult to draw inferences about the loss or sparing of underlying semantic representations.
Our aim in this paper is to demonstrate that the appropriate use of on-line tasks, in particular semantic priming, can provide insights into the nature of semantic memory impairments that cannot be garnered from the use of traditional off-line tasks alone. The reason for this is that semantic priming taps automatic or implicit access to semantic representations, rather than voluntary access. It is possible for stored semantic information to be intact and accessible in an implicit, automatic task like priming, but for that same information to be inaccessible to voluntary access processes which have been disrupted in some way. Thus, we can compare priming data with data from off-line tasks in order to discriminate between problems of storage and problems of voluntary access. Moreover, we can investigate the detailed pattern of loss and preservation of different types of semantic information, by charting the priming effects for different kinds of words, and different kinds of semantic relations between primes and targets. This is not to claim that the priming task is without pitfalls (although most of these can be avoided, as we argue later), or that it should replace other tasks entirely-indeed we will suggest that the most fruitful approach is to make use of both kinds of task in concert-but rather that data from priming can make a unique contribution to our understanding of semantic memory, both in characterising the functional impairments of different patients and in understanding the normal system.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: in the first section we discuss in more detail the issue of distinguishing impairments of semantic representation and access. We then examine the use of the semantic priming task in this context, identifying a number of theoretical and methodological issues that need to be addressed. Finally, we describe two of our recent studies, which illustrate the use of the priming paradigm in exploring semantic memory. The first investigates the nature of the "loss of semantic memory" in a patient with semantic dementia, and the second concerns knowledge of abstract and concrete word meanings in two non-fluent aphasic, deep dyslexic patients. In each study we discuss the implications of the findings for accounts of representation and processing in the normal semantic system as well as the functional impairments of the individual patients.
IMPAIRMENTS OF ACCESS AND STORAGE
The difficulty associated with distinguishing between storage and access deficits of semantic memory has led to discussions of how we might discriminate between them (Shallice, 1988a, b; Warrington & Shallice, 1979) . On the one hand, it is relatively straightforward to identify access deficits that are specific to one modality of input (and similarly, to identify modality-specific production deficits, which could also be a confounding factor). This requires the testing of patients with a range of different tasks that probe semantic knowledge via different input and output modalities-typically picture matching to a written or spoken word, naming to a picture or written or spoken word, relatedness judgments, picture sorting, and so on. An example of a modality-specific access problem identified on this basis is provided by Franklin, Howard, and Patterson (1994) in a study of a patient with abstract word deafness. Where a patient has a problem across the range of tasks, a modality-specific access problem can be ruled out, as for example, for the semantic dementia patients studied by Hodges et al. (1992a) .
We should note here that we are referring to modality-specificity within the verbal domain, e.g. to written versus spoken words, rather than to the distinction between verbal and visual inputs in general. When patients have shown dissociations between recognition of objects/pictures and understanding of the corresponding verbal labels, this has sometimes been interpreted as a modaljtyspecific access deficit (e.g. Riddoch et al., 1988) , but other researchers have claimed that there is a storage impairment to one or other of multiple semantic systems, suggesting that there are separate visual and verbal (and possibly other) semantic stores (e.g. Shallice 1988b; Warrington, 1975) . Our current discussions concern only verbal inputs. We believe that it is implausible to attribute a deficit in, say, comprehension of spoken words but not written words, to an impairment in the semantic store for spoken language, while the meanings of the same words are preserved in a separate semantic store for written language, and we also believe that modality-specific deficits within the verbal domain can be interpreted as clear evidence that the impairment is one of access rather than storage. Generalised modality-independent access deficits are not so straightforwardly isolated. Where a patient shows a semantic deficit across different input and output modalities, the possibility remains that this does not reveal loss or degradation of information in semantic memory, but rather a modalityindependent problem with accessing that information under voluntary control. The distinction between voluntary or effortful and automatic access is an important one in memory research (Hasher & Zacks, 1979 ) and has been valuable in studies of acquired language disorders (Chenery, Ingram, & Murdoch, 1990 Tyler, 1992 . All the tasks standardly used to investigate memory impairments (picture-pointing, sorting, category fluency, and so on) involve voluntary access to, and reflection on, semantic representations. One approach to disentangling disorders of storage and access was provided by Warrington and Shallice (1979) who suggested a number of criteria for identifying the two kinds of impairment. They argued that a patient with a central storage disorder would show consistency of errors on individual items across tasks and testing sessions, relative preservation of superordinate over feature-level knowledge, and a frequency effect, but no effect of semantic priming (or more correctly, cueing). Warrington and McCarthy (1983) added the additional criterion that such patients would also show no effect of rate of presentation of materials. An access disorder would be revealed by the opposite pattern of performance. These criteria have been widely applied, although often only a subset of the criteria have been tested for individual patients (e.g. Butterworth, Howard, & McLoughlin, 1984; Chertkow & Bub, 1990; Hillis, Rapp, Romani, & Caramazza, 1990; Warrington & Shallice, 1984) . However, the validity of this approach has recently been questioned, most notably by Rapp and Caramazza (1993) (see also Riddoch et al., 1988) . The central problem is that, depending on the specific model of semantic representation and access adopted, the supposedly distinguishing patterns of performance may be consistent with either storage or access deficits.
Although we agree with many of the points made by Rapp and Caramazza (1993) , we believe that semantic priming performance is less vulnerable to their critique than the other criteria. Moreover, because the semantic priming task reflects automatic rather than voluntary access to semantic information, it enables us to tap into semantic representation in a different way from other tasks. In this paper we focus only on this on-line version of semantic priming. In some studies, the term semantic priming has been used synonymously with semantic cueing, in which subjects are prompted with a related cue word when they are unable to name a picture, for example. Although this has some properties in common with priming, it is not an on-line task, as subjects are still required to access information under voluntary control, and the relation between the cue and the target is explicit. The patterns of performance in cueing and priming tasks have been shown to differ (Chertkow & Bub, 1990) . In the following section we discuss the priming task as a probe of semantic memory impairment in more detail, and address potential theoretical and methodological problems, including those raised by Rapp and Caramazza.
SEMANTIC PRIMING AND AUTOMATIC ACCESS
Semantic priming involves automatic, implicit access to semantic information, rather than voluntary, explicit retrieval. Subjects are asked to make a timed response, such as lexical decision or naming, to a target word. The latency and accuracy of this response are measured as a function of the preceding prime word. It has frequently been demonstrated that when the prime word is semantically or associatively related (e.g. car-DOG), responses to the target are facilitated compared to the baseline condition in which the preceding word is unrelated (e.g. pen-DOG), both for young (e.g. Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971; Moss, Ostrin, Tyler, & Marslen-Wilson, in press ; for a review see Neely, 1991) and older adult subjects (Burke, White, & Diaz, 1987; Ostrin & Tyler, 1993) . Priming is believed to tap implicit, automatic access because subjects are not instructed to pay attention to the relation between prime and target-in fact, pains are taken to try to obscure the relation by the use of unrelated filler items. Facilitation of the target by the preceding prime appears to stem from automatic processes, of which the subject may be completely unaware. Thus priming can be used to assess the nature of underlying semantic representations without involving controlled access processes.
Several different accounts have been put forward to explain the priming effects found in the normal system (for a review see Neely, 1991) . These include spread of activation between related concepts in a semantic network (Collins & Loftus, 1975) , perseveration of activation of overlapping microfeatures in a distributed memory system (Masson, 1991) , and the use of prime and target to form a compound cue to search semantic memory (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992) . On all such accounts (and it is beyond the current scope to try to distinguish between them) priming is based on automatic, non-conscious processes. We should note here that several non-automatic components of priming have been suggested, such as generation of expectancy sets and semantic matching (see Neely, 1991 for a review). However, it is clear that these account for only a part of the facilitation found in most cases, (e.g. Fischler, 1977a; Posner & Snyder, 1975) and also that the contribution of "strategic effects" can be reduced in various ways, such as having a low proportion of related items in the list (e.g. de Groot, 1984; Tweedy, Lapinski, & Schvaneveldt, 1977) and a short delay between prime and target (de Groot, 1984) . ' Therefore we can use the priming task to provide evidence as to whether a patient's impairment in off-line tests of semantic knowledge results from loss or damage to representations in semantic memory, or a disruption in the process of accessing those representations under voluntary control. If the disorder is one of representation, we would not expect to find normal semantic priming effects, as information that is lost or damaged will be inaccessible (or difficult to access) to automatic access as well as to voluntary access. On the other hand, if the impairment is one of voluntary access to intact underlying representations, then normal priming is predicted, supported by automatic access. This rationale has now been applied in several studies of semantic impairment, in which performance in a priming task has been compared with that in off-line tasks, most frequently for patients with Alzheimer's dementia (e.g. Chertkow, Bub, & Seidenberg, 1989; Glosser & Friedman, 1991; Nebes, Martin, & Horn, 1984) .
However, it is important to note that a lack of priming effects for a patient in a particular task does not, by itself, necessarily implicate a central semantic storage deficit. In certain cases it could be that the lack of priming stems from a disruption of the automatic access processes that underpin priming effects. This claim has been made by Milberg and Blumstein and colleagues for a group of nonfluent aphasic patients (Blumstein, Milberg, & Shrier, 1982; Milberg & Blumstein, 1981) . These patients did not show significant semantic priming effects in a visual lexical decision study. Rather than interpreting this as a semantic storage deficit, the authors argued that nonfluent aphasics have problems with the automatic activation of lexical information. One variant of this claim is that the activation processes are abnormally slow, so that priming is not observed at short delays. The basis of the claim that the lack of priming stems from disruption of automatic access rather than loss of information within semantic memory, is that the nonfluent patients performed well in a semantic relatedness judgment task on the same word-pairs as used in the priming task, demonstrating that they were able to access the meanings of the words in a task where speed of automatic activation was not a crucial factor.
' One of the suggested strategic priming mechanisms is post-lexical semantic matching-that is, trying to integrate the target with the prime to give a coherent meaning. It is arguable that this is in fact an automatic rather than strategic process, and reflects the normal processes of language comprehension, i s . integrating the successive words of an utterance (Hodgson, 1991).
Although we have argued against this particular version of the automaticity hypothesis (Tyler, Ostrin, Cooke, & Moss, 1995) , it highlights the point that an absence of semantic priming can be due to a disruption of automatic access processes as well as to loss or damage to semantic representations. For this reason, it is vital that priming studies are carried out, not in isolation, but in conjunction with a range of tasks that reflect voluntary access, and which do not rely on real-time automatic activation processes being completely unimpaired. If a patient does not show priming, but performs well in off-line tasks, disruption of automatic access may be the correct account. However, if there is no priming and a patient also performs poorly in off-line tasks, then it is more likely that there has been damage to the underlying semantic representations.
Both sets of priming studies mentioned here-those of semantic memory loss in DAT and of automatic access in nonfluent aphasics-have produced apparently conflicting results and interpretations. However, we believe that this does not reflect a problem inherent in the use of the priming task. One source of the problem is that many of the studies have averaged results over groups of patients classified in different ways, such that different deficits or combinations of deficits in the representation and access of semantic information may be confounded both within and across studies (cf Badecker & Caramazza, 1985) . For this reason, our approach is to investigate the priming performance of single patients in detail. In addition, most studies have paid little attention to the types of semantic relation tested, and strength of semantic relation between primes and target, factors that we have found to be crucial to the pattern of results obtained with normal subjects. We return to these points in more detail in the later sections.
THEORETICAL ISSUES IN THE USE OF PRIMING TO PROBE SEMANTIC MEMORY IMPAIRMENTS
Two main kinds of objection have been raised to the use of priming to probe the nature of semantic memory impairments. The first is that priming may reflect "low-level' ' intra-lexical connections rather than access to information within semantic memory (Shallice, 1988a ,c, cited in Rapp & Caramazza, 1993 . The other is that priming may be supported by semantic representations that are partially degraded, and so may not distinguish a disorder of storage from one of access (Chertkow et al., 1989; Rapp & Caramazza, 1993) . We believe that although these are valid concerns, both can be addressed.
The first point is that the priming criterion may conflict with other indices of storage/access disorders because priming could stem from low-level "presemantic" connections (Shallice, 1988c) .This claim rests on the assumption that, in addition to conceptual/semantic representations of the meanings of words, there are also lexical-level representations, encoding the form of the words. This distinction between lexical form and semantic representations is clearly drawn in most models of language comprehension, including the kind of spreading activation network models that have been widely adopted in the priming literature (Collins 13 Loftus, 1975; McNamara, 1992) . On this kind of model, activation may spread between nodes at either the semantic level or at the lexical-form level. It is possible that a patient with loss or damage to semantic representations would still show a normal priming effect, supported by intra-lexical spread of activation rather than activation of representations in semantic memory, and as such the usefulness of priming as a probe of semantic knowledge would be seriously undermined.
Our reply to this point is that this may be true of priming based on associative strength between words, but it cannot account for priming between nonassociated semantically related words. Associated word pairs can be identified by the frequency with which the target is given as a response to the prime in association norms (e.g. Moss & Older, in prep.). For example, over 50% of subjects give dog as the first word they think of in response to cat. Several researchers have argued that association strength reflects the frequent cooccurrence of words in the language, over and above any semantic relation between them (Glosser & Friedman, 1991; Moss, Ostrin, Tyler, & MarslenWilson, in press; Shelton & Martin, 1992) and this is supported by findings of correlations between associative strength and co-occurrence of words in large language corpora (Rapp & Wettler, 1991; Spence & Owens, 1990) . Thus, it is plausible that priming between strongly associated word stems from spreading activation between lexical representations, with the activation links built up by frequency of co-occurrence.
However, it has also been shown that words that are semantically related in various ways, but share no associative strength, support priming (e.g. Chiarello, Burgess, Richard, & Pollock, 1990 Fischler, 1977b Moss, Ostrin, Tyler, & Marslen-Wilson, in press ). For example, word pairs like pig-horse, broomfloor, stick-cane, which are semantically related in one way or another, but not associated, produce reliable priming effects. We have also demonstrated that priming for associated words differs both quantitatively and qualitatively from priming for words that are purely semantically related, for normal subjects; associative priming is usually greater in magnitude (Moss, Ostrin, Tyler, & Marslen-Wilson, in press) , and is less affected by contextual semantic influences (Moss & Marslen-Wilson, 1993 ; see also Tanenhaus & Lucas, 1987)*. It is unlikely that priming for words that are semantically related but share no degree It has recently been claimed that a further distinction can be drawn between semantic and associative priming; that associative priming is automatic, whereas purely semantic priming is based on post-lexical strategic mechanisms (Shelton & Martin, 1992) . This was based on a finding of significant priming for associated category co-ordinates (e.g. cot-dog) but not purely semantic related co-ordinates (e.g. pig-horse) in a visual single-word lexical decision experiment. However, we have recently questioned this claim, and shown that purely semantic priming is obtained in this paradigm for at least some types of semantic relation (Moss, Ostrin, Tyler, & Marsh-Wilson, in press).
of associative strength is underpinned by low-level intra-lexical connections. Therefore, when priming is used to probe the nature of representations in semantic memory, it is essential to separate associated and purely semantically related materials. If significant priming is found for associated conditions only, there are grounds for suggesting that there has been loss or damage within the semantic system, but that lexical-level representations and connections are intact. However, if a patient shows significant priming effects for purely semantically related pairs (as well as associated words) this suggests that priming is tapping truly semantic-level knowledge. Although it is theoretically possible that there is some small degree of lexical co-occurrence for semantically related words, which is too weak to be picked up in association norms, such weak connections are unlikely to contribute greatly to any priming effects observed for such word pairs.
On these grounds, it is possible that intact lexical-level associative connections may be the correct account of the priming results for patients with DAT. Glosser and Friedman (1991) reported a group of patients with DAT who showed associative but not purely semantic priming. Most studies of priming for DAT patients have used strongly associated word pairs (e.g. Nebes et al., 1984) so it is possible that associative links are responsible for these effects. In the one study where non-associated semantically related word pairs were tested, an abnormal pattern of hyper-priming was found (for some words at least), suggesting impaired semantic representations (Chertkow et al., 1989) .
The second kind of objection to the priming task as a probe of semantic memory, is that priming may be supported even though the semantic representations involved have been impaired in some way: that is, that the presence of priming in a patient may be consistent with a semantic storage impairment rather than an access impairment, as long as we accept that an impairment of storage does not necessarily entail all-or-none loss of semantic representations, but can also be due to partial degradation of some kind.
This point has been made by Rapp and Caramazza (1993) . They suggest that a storage deficit may be based on the raising of activation thresholds for the nodes encoding some or all of the features making up a semantic representation. To use their example, the semantic representation for stool will include the features (three legs, for sitting, wooden, no buck), all of which nodes are activated when the word stool is heard. On this kind of model, some of the same features will also be activated by semantically similar words (e.g. ruble will include four legs and wooden) and this is the basis for priming. One account of damage to stored representations in this model is that the activation thresholds for some feature nodes are elevated, such that, when for example stool is heard, its features will not be "recognised". But the prior presentation of a related prime will provide additional activation to the feature nodes it shares with the target. This additional activation may be sufficient to push the node over the elevated threshold, speeding word recognition, and thus facilitation will be seen. Given this kind of distributed activation model, this is a possibility that seems plausible. Indeed, models of this kind tend to blur the distinction between disorders of representation and access generally. Chertkow et al., (1989) make a similar claim. They found a pattern of hyperpriming for six patients with DAT: that is, very long lexical-decision reaction times and exaggerated priming effects, particularly for those target words that earlier testing had shown to be unknown to the patient, as determined in off-line tasks. The explanation is that damage to a semantic representation led to a long baseline reaction time for a word, and thus it would "stand more to gain" from spreading activation provided by the prime. Similarly, if we adopt the framework that priming in lexical decision is post-lexical, the following account could hold: subjects consult semantic memory before making a decision, with reaction times being slower when the item to be checked has an impaired semantic representation. The presence of the prime word may facilitate this checking (focusing attention on the correct superordinate category)-giving the observed pattern of long reaction times with large priming effects. Although there are other possible accounts of hyper-priming that do not involve degraded semantic representations (for example, there might be difficulties at some point in the word-recognition process, or in the decision making required for lexical decision), Chertkow et al.'s account, like that of Rapp and Caramazza, suggests ways in which partially degraded semantic representations could support priming.
If impaired representations can support priming, then performance in the priming paradigm may not be able to distinguish between intact and degraded semantic representations. This would reduce its usefulness as an index of semantic memory impairment or preservation. However, it is possible to distinguish "normal" priming effects based on intact semantic representations, and abnormal priming effects, which may be based on partial, damaged semantic representations. There are two ways in which we can do this. The first rests on the fact that the accounts of priming by partial semantic representations, discussed earlier, all predict abnormally long reaction times to target words in the baseline or control condition (i.e. when they are not preceded by the related primes). It is clear from priming studies with unimpaired subjects, that semantic information is involved at a very early stage in reaction-time tasks such as lexical decision and naming (Balota, Ferraro, & Connor, 1991; James, 1975) Therefore, degraded semantic representations will make word recognition more difficult, and lexical decision latencies longer, allowing for disproportionately large priming effects when the semantic information is supplemented by the prime. This is the basis of the "stands more to gain" account of the hyperpriming pattern reported by Chertkow et al. We would argue, then, that if a patient shows baseline reaction times and priming effects well within the normal range, this indicates "normal" priming based on intact semantic representations, rather than hyper-priming based on degraded representations.
It should be noted that, in spite of the evidence of semantic involvement in lexical decision in normal subjects, access to semantic information is not necessary for lexical decision: it would be possible to make the decision as a result of accessing (or failing to access) a lexical form representation only. It is possible that some patients are making lexical decisions in this way, and thus that degraded semantic representations would have no effect on lexical decision latencies. Specifically, degraded semantic representations would not result in the abnormally long baseline reaction times predicted on the hyper-priming account. However, if this were the case, we would not expect to see a semantic priming effect at all in such patients. If semantic information is not involved at any point in the lexical decision response, then it would not be possible for prior access to related semantic information (i.e. the prime) to facilitate that response. A patient performing lexical decision without reference to semantics might be expected to show a similar pattern to normal subjects who have been encouraged to process words very shallowly, by doing a letter search on the visually presented prime. This manipulation appears to eliminate semantic priming, presumably because the meaning of the prime has not been accessed (Henik, Fredrich, & Kellog, 1982) . Therefore, although it is possible that a given patient could be making lexical decisions without accessing semantic information, this would tend to lead to a pattern of no priming, rather than a pattern of hyper-priming. Thus, this possibility does not affect the interpretation of hyper-priming as a possible indicator of degraded semantic representations. What it does highlight, however, is that a finding of an across-the-board absence of semantic priming for a patient does not necessarily indicate loss of semantic information. The lack of priming could result from the patient performing lexical decision without reference to semantic information.
A second way to determine whether priming is based on intact rather than partial semantic representations is to establish that a normal priming effect holds up for a range of different kinds of semantic relationship. For example, if cut primes whiskers, kitten, pet, and black, as well as dog, then this would be strong evidence that there has been no extensive loss of the semantic properties of cat, even if the patient is unable to access these kinds of information under voluntary control in an off-line task. On the other hand, we might find a pattern of priming for certain types of semantic information and not others, which would be consistent with an account in terms of partial degradation (extending to the relations that fail to prime) and partial preservation of information (for those relations that support priming). It is important to note that a lack of priming for specific types of semantic information is different from an across-the-board absence of priming. As we discussed in the previous paragraph, a general lack of priming is difficult to interpret because of the possibility of lexical decision without semantic access. However, a lack of priming for specific types of semantic information, in the face of normal priming for other types of semantic information could not be accounted for in this way. Distinguishing between these two patterns is an additional motivation for examining priming for a range of semantic relations.
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN THE USE OF

PRIMING TO PROBE SEMANTIC MEMORY
A second set of potential objections to the priming task involve methodological considerations; certain patients may not be able to perform the priming task well enough for reliable results to be obtained. First, many patients with semantic memory impairments will have accompanying reading difficulties (whether these are independent or connected deficits may vary over different patients), and therefore auditory presentation of stimuli will sometimes be necessary. Although the vast majority of priming studies with the unimpaired population have been conducted in the visual domain (see Neely, 1991 for a review), we have found that semantic and associative priming are reliably obtained in the auditory modality for both young (Moss, Ostrin, Tyler, & Marslen-Wilson, in press), and elderly (Tyler, Ostrin, Cooke, & Moss, 1995) normal populations.
However, even when materials are spoken rather than written, some patients find it difficult to perform the standard reaction-time tasks with sufficient speed or accuracy for results to be meaningful. In several studies we have used a lexical decision task. Both fluent and non-fluent aphasic subjects have performed well in this task, with reaction times within or close to the range for age-matched controls. However, high error rates can be a problem, seriously reducing the amount of data left for analysis (for example, in the study of Blumstein et al., 1982 , patients in some groups were performing with error rates over 30%). Where this is a problem, several measures can be taken. One is to lengthen the interval between prime and target (ISI) to allow patients more time to process the primes. This can be useful to a certain point, but at longer ISIs the possible contribution of strategic priming effects (in the control population if not the patients themselves) must be considered and controlled for where possible. Another approach is to simplify the task by using a single word presentation procedure rather than the standard prime-target pair task. (Shelton & Martin, 1989; . In this version of the task, all the primes, targets, and fillers are presented in a list and the subject makes a lexical decision to every word, rather than just to the targets. The advantage of this task is that patients do not have to distinguish between the primes to which no response is made, and the targets to which they should make a response. An independent advantage of this task is also that it is thought to minimise strategic priming effects, which is helpful when priming is being used with the express goal of tapping into automatic access. On the other hand, the disadvantage is that the inter-stimulus interval must be long enough to allow for the lexical decision response to be completed, which can necessitate long delays between primes and targets.
For subjects who have difficulty with a lexical decision task, even in the simplified single word presentation task, we have developed a primed monitoring rusk, which we have found to be suitable for use with various patients. In this task, subjects are asked to monitor for a target in a list of words and to press a response button when they hear it. In the primed condition the target is preceded by a related word, and in the control condition the prime is replaced with an unrelated word. Priming is measured as the difference in reaction time to the target in the two conditions, in the standard way. Studies with control subjects have shown that the priming effects in this task are comparable with those from a lexical decision task. We have also found that many patients with aphasia and semantic dementia are able to perform the task fast and accurately (Moss, Tyler, Hodges, & Patterson, 1995) . Moreover, the primed monitoring task provides a means of testing semantic priming in patients with severe semantic impairments who would not be testable under more standard conditions. In order to provide a suitable estimate of the normal priming effects against which to evaluate the performance of a patient it is, of course, necessary to establish that the priming effects of interest are reliable for a group of agematched control subjects. Effects should reach significance in analyses of mean reaction times calculated over both subjects and materials. It is also important to establish whether or not patients' responses in both test and control conditions are within the normal range (especially to identify possible hyper-priming effects).
Although the priming effects we report are always highly significant for control groups, it is occasionally the case that an individual control subject shows no priming. A failure to show priming can arise for a variety of reasons; in lexical decision, a subject could possibly adopt a strategy of making lexical decisions without reference to semantic information (as discussed earlier), he or she could have difficulties with the attentional demands of the task, or the decision components of lexical decision. Other factors can arise in different paradigms. For example, in the prime monitoring task, we have found that a few subjects respond so rapidly in the unrelated condition, that there is little room for any speeding-up of reaction times in the related condition. Whatever the cause, this kind of general lack of priming, which occurs for a minority of control subjects, is not problematic for our interpretation of patient data. As we argued earlier, we would not make any claims about the nature of semantic representation and processing only on the basis of an overall lack of priming, exactly because this lack of priming could have numerous causes other than semantic impairment. In cases where we are claiming that there is a semantic impairment, this is based on differential patterns of priming across conditions. In these cases it is always necessary to examine individual control subjects' data to ensure that no control shows the same pattern as a patient; i.e. that the pattern of priming could not be considered normal.
To summarise, priming is a valuable task for probing the nature of semantic memory impairment as it reflects automatic rather than controlled access to semantic representations. If measures are taken to ensure that priming is reflecting more than intra-lexical associations, and to distinguish possible hyperpriming from normal priming, priming experiments can be an important part of neuropsychological study of semantic memory. In the following sections we describe two studies that illustrate some of the ways in which the priming paradigm (in conjunction with other tasks) can contribute to our understanding of the representation and access of semantic information. These examples also show how we have implemented the measures that we have argued to be necessary to address specific theoretical and methodological issues.
EXPLORING THE LOSS OF SEMANTIC MEMORY IN SEMANTIC DEMENTIA
Our first example of the use of priming to probe semantic memory impairment concerns a patient, PP, with profound semantic dementia. This study was camed out in collaboration with John Hodges and Karalyn Patterson (Moss, Tyler, Hodges, & Patterson, 1995) . Because PP has been described in detail elsewhere (Hodges, Patterson, Oxbury, & Funnell, 1992 ; we give only a brief summary here. See Table 1 for case details. Semantic dementia refers to a form of progressive aphasia with selective deterioration of semantic memory, accompanied by relative sparing of other linguistic and cognitive abilities (Snowden et al., 1989) . A series of studies by Hodges and Patterson and colleagues has charted the extent of PP's semantic memory impairment in detail (Hodges, Patterson, Oxbury, & Funnell, 1992 ; Hodges et al., 1994) . Table 2 shows PP's performance on a battery of tasks designed to probe knowledge of object and word meanings via different input and output modalities, administered in August, 1990. Her performance was at floor on most of the tasks. For example, she was unable to produce any exemplars of six categories in a fluency task, or to name any picture or object presented to her. There was some ability to sort at the highest level of living For further details see Hodges, Patterson, Oxbury, and Funnel1 (1992) and .
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versus man-made object, but this too declined over the testing period. In contrast, PP's autobiographical and episodic memory remained relatively intact (she was able to remember appointments and keep track of family events). Also visuo-spatial abilities and working memory were unimpaired, as demonstrated, for example, by her digit span (9 forward, 6 backward) and performance on the Rey figure copy (32/36) and Raven's coloured matrices (35136). PP's inability to perform any task requiring semantic knowledge extended to all input and output modalities tested. There seemed to be no difference whether objects were presented as pictures or as spoken words or definitions, or whether she was required to name, sort, or describe objects. This pattern of performance would suggest a central deficit to stored semantic knowledge rather than a problem with access to that information. Consistent with this hypothesis, one of the last tasks that she could perform above chance was sorting at superordinate level. It has been claimed that preserved knowledge of superordinate category in the face of loss of more fine-grained semantic attributes stems from loss of information within the semantic system (Shallice, 1988a; Wanington & Shallice, 1979) .
However, as discussed earlier, all the tasks used to assess PP's semantic knowledge involved voluntary access to semantic representations, and so it is possible that what seems to be a clear disorder of storage could in fact be a profound disturbance in the processes of accessing semantic information under voluntary control. The relative preservation of superordinate sorting is inconclusive on this question for two reasons: (1) it may be possible to perform at an elevated level in the high-level sorting task by exploiting general visual similarities between pictures in the living versus non-living categories (PP's good performance on visuo-spatial problem-solving tasks suggests that this is plausible), and ( 2 ) an advantage for superordinate information does not necessarily implicate loss of underlying semantic information but could also be consistent with a range of access disorders (Rapp & Caramazza, 1993) . It was not possible to apply other standard diagnostics of a storage disorderconsistency of correct and incorrect responses over the same items on different tasks and testing sessions, or the presence of a frequency effect-as there were too few correct answers to analyse Therefore, this was an ideal situation in which to employ semantic priming as a probe of semantic memory impairment. This study is reported in more detail in Moss, Tyler, Hodges, and Patterson (1995) .
The basic predictions for the priming task were as outlined earlier: if PP has suffered extensive loss of semantic information, then we would expect her to show little or no normal priming effects, or, if the loss of information is partial rather than complete, to show abnormally long reaction times and large priming effects. On the other hand, if PP's impairment is one of voluntary access to intact underlying representations, then normal priming is predicted. In order to ensure that priming was supported by relations within the semantic system, and not just intra-lexical connections, we contrasted conditions in which primes and targets were strongly associated (greater than 20% association strength) and conditions in which prime and target shared the same kind of semantic relation but were not normatively associated in either forward or backward direction. We tested two main kinds of semantic relation. The first was common category membership (e.g. pig-horse, gold-silver), and the second was a functional relation between the referent of the prime and target, e.g. broom-floor, where you use a broom to sweep thejloor, or theatre-play, where you go to the theatre to see a play. The motivation for including these types of relation was that the category relation could be supported by the kind of superordinate knowledge that is thought to be relatively preserved in semantic memory disorder, while the functional relations are an example of the kind of detailed attribute knowledge which is expected to be more vulnerable to semantic deficits. In addition, both these relations have been found to support robust priming for unimpaired subjects in previous priming studies (Moss, Ostrin, Tyler, & Marslen-Wilson, in press).
The three variables-type of semantic relation (category co-ordinate or functionally related), association (strongly associated or non-associated), and prime type (related or unrelated)-were fully crossed, so that there were 12 prime-target pairs in each of the four conditions: associated category coordinates (e.g. dog-cat), non-associated category co-ordinates (e.g. pig-horse), associated functional relations (e.g. hammer-nail), and non-associated functional relations (e.g. broom-floor). Each target word was also paired with an unrelated "prime" to give the corresponding control conditions (e.g. boatcat, chair-horse, oven-nail, pumpfloor etc.). Length and frequency of words in each condition were matched, as was the strength of semantic relation between prime and target. To determine strength of semantic relation, all prime-target pairs were presented to a group of 12-15 young control subjects, who were asked to rate how related the two words were in meaning on a scale of 1-9. In order to control for possible natural kind/artifact category differences, half of the pairs in the category co-ordinate conditions came from natural kind categories, such as animals, vegetables, and metals, and half from artifact categories such as tools and vehicles. All the words in the functional conditions referred to artifacts .
We established in pilot studies that PP was unable to perform a lexical decision task with any accuracy, and so the primed monitoring task described earlier was used. We also determined for PP that the optimum interval between items in the list was 1500ms. Because this long inter-stimulus interval (ISI) could allow for strategic priming effects, we ran a preliminary study with two groups of control subjects; one group with the 1500ms IS1 and the other with the same materials at a 200ms ISI. This established that the pattern of results at the short and long delay were identical. Primes and targets (or unrelated controls and targets) were embedded in lists of between four and ten words. Items were counterbalanced over two versions to avoid repetition of items within subjects. In order to increase the reliability of the priming results, PP was tested on two occasions about two months apart (November, 1991 and January, 1992) . The procedure and design were identical in the two sessions, but two different sets of items were used, which met all the criteria described earlier.
The results for PP and the seven age-matched control subjects are shown in Table 3 . As associative strength had no effect in any analysis, the results are collapsed over this factor. The control group showed a consistent priming effect for all conditions, with no interactions with degree of association or with type of semantic relation-50ms priming for category co-ordinates and 55ms for functionally related items: F1(1,6)= 15.5, P < 0.01; F2(1,40)= 151, P < 0.001.
PP, however, showed a different pattern, with a significant interaction between priming and type of semantic relation, F2(1,88) = 6.8, P < 0.01. This was due to there being a significant facilitation effect for the functional condition, 50ms, F2(1,40)= 10.7, P -= 0.01, but not for the category coordinates, -llms, F < 1.
Further examination of the category co-ordinate condition confirmed that PP showed no priming for either the natural kind category members (-5ms) or the artifact category members (-17ms). It may be noted from the range data in Table  3 that one control subject shows no priming for the category co-ordinate condition. However, the same control subjects shows no priming for the functionally related items either, and thus the pattern is not the same as that for PP, where the crucial result is the difference between the priming effect for category co-ordinates and functionally related items, rather than being the absence of priming per se. It is clear that PP is not showing hyper-priming, as her overall reaction times, as well as the size of the facilitation effect in the functional condition, are well within the range for her age group. In addition, she made almost no errors. The fact that priming (in the functional condition) was as great for non-associated as associated items shows that she was not relying solely on lexical level connections. These results suggest that although information relating members of a common semantic category is lost from PP's semantic memory, knowledge of detailed functional properties of objects is not lost, but is inaccessible to voluntary access. The fact that relations between words such as broom-floor and restaurant-wine reliably supported priming indicates that this kind of functional semantic relation was still represented and accessible to automatic access. This was in spite of the fact that PP had no conscious awareness of this information and was unable to use it explicitly. PP's inability to use functional semantic information in an explicit task was shown in a number of the tasks reported by Hodges et al. (1992 Hodges et al. ( , 1994 . For example, even as early as 1990, she was unable to sort pictures according to functional properties such as electrical vs nonelectrical, or to answer feature probe questions about functional properties of objects. Moreover, in February, 1991, she could not group real household objects according to, their functional relatedness (e.g. candle and matches, needle and sewing thread), and she was able to mime the use of only 8 out of 25 objects . It was not possible to carry out a task such as semantic relatedness judgments on the same set of items as used in the priming task, as PP was unable to understand a judgment task by the time of testing. However, the kinds of items used in the earlier semantic battery tasks were very similar to those used in the priming task. Thus the comparison between the on and off-line results provides a clear dissociation in perf~rmance.~ It is perhaps surprising that the information that is retained concerns detailed functional attributes of the words' referents, rather than superordinate information which would support priming between members of a common category. This is inconsistent with the view that superordinate information is preferentially preserved in the face of semantic memory impairment. However, the ability to access functional information automatically is consistent with an observation that has been made about patients with semantic dementia by several researchers; that is, that they are often able to use objects in appropriate ways, in spite of being unable to demonstrate knowledge of the semantic properties of those objects in any other way (Saffran & Schwartz, 1992; Snowden, Griffiths, & Neary, 1994; this volume) . PP could also use objects in everyday life to some extent, being able to dress herself and use cutlery appropriately to eat, even late into the progression of the semantic dementia, when she performed very poorly in off-line tests of semantic knowledge of all It will be noted that the off-line tasks were carried out some time before our priming study. By the time we were testing PP with the primed monitoring she could not understand the instructions for off-line tasks. It seems reasonable to assume that her performance would have deteriorated further, if anything, by the time we carried out the priming study. Thus her ability to do the monitoring task and show significant priming is even more striking.
kinds. What priming and everyday object use have in common is that access to the semantic information necessary to support them is implicit and automatic. There is no requirement to retrieve certain representations under voluntary control and to reflect on them in any way. Priming demonstrates that this information was also available at a linguistic level when accessed under the right conditions; knowledge about what you do with a broom or a hammer could be accessed by hearing the words broom and hammer as well as by needing to sweep the floor or knock in a nail.
Elsewhere we have discussed in detail the possible bases for the dissociation between category and functional information (Moss, Tyler, Hodges, & Patterson, 1995) . These include loss of certain kinds of semantic feature (similar in some ways to the account of category-specific deficits given by Farah & McClelland, 199 1) or preservation of script-type representations of event structure. Although we do not yet have a complete account for the basis of the pattern of impairments, the important point is that it was only by using the priming task that we were unable to uncover the distinction between category and functional information at all. In all tasks that tapped voluntary access, PP was equally impaired for all kinds of information tested.
The implication of this study for our understanding of semantic memory in general is that there may be representational distinctions among different types of semantic information about the meanings of words/concepts that cut across different content domains, such as living things and artifacts. This kind of distinction between different kinds of semantic information has been hypothesised as a potential basis for category-specific deficits, the claim being that the semantic representations of living things have a higher weighting of perceptual features over functional features than do the representations of artifacts (Farah & McClelland, 1991; Warrington & McCarthy, 1987) . We are not suggesting here that PP has a category-specific deficit for natural kinds, as she showed no priming for either artifact or natural-kind category co-ordinates, and no evidence of a selective deficit in the range of semantic tasks reported by Hodges and colleagues, but rather that there could be a similar kind of account in terms of damage to specific types of semantic property.
The priming data for PP advances previous accounts of representational differences for different kinds of information in two ways: First, it provides direct evidence of a difference in impairment for two different kinds of information, rather than indirect evidence on the basis of category differences; and second, it suggests a division between functional properties and taxonomic or category-based information, which has not previously been demonstrated. A final observation is that the apparent loss of category information did not lead to abnormally long reaction times and disproportionately large priming effects for PP, even though she could be described as having partially degraded semantic representation (i.e. loss of taxonomic information but intact functional information). This also suggests independent representations of the two kinds of information, as loss of one kind does not adversely affect priming for the other.
An important question is whether the distinction between preserved priming for functional but not category priming will be found for other patients who have semantic dementia or similar forms of progressive aphasia. We have recently started to see evidence of this pattern emerging in a second patient, in a study that we are carrying out in collaboration with John Hodges and Karalyn Patterson (Tyler, Moss, . FM is a 57-year-old woman who was originally reported as having semantic dementia by Hodges, Patterson, Oxbury and Funnel1 (1992) , although subsequent testing has revealed that she is not a typical case of semantic dementia. Her semantic impairment is mild relative to the degree of anomia, and syntactic as well as semantic deficits have developed (Patterson, Hodges, Graham, & Coot, 1994 ; Tyler, Moss, . Nevertheless, she can still be compared to PP under the more general notion of fluent progressive aphasia.
We have tested FM in a priming study which probes a range of semantic relationships, including the category and functional relations tested in our study of PP. In this experiment the same prime word was tested across all semantic relations. The category co-ordinate condition was similar to that in the previous study (e.g. squirrel-rabbit, aeroplane-train). In the functional condition, the target word described a functional (i.e. non-perceptual property) of the prime, as established in a property listing pre-test (e.g. squirrel-tree, ueroplune-pilot). In all cases, prime and target were not normatively associated.
Unlike PP, FM is able to perform a lexical decision task with few errors and with reaction times not greatly slower than the normal range. Therefore we used a paired auditory lexical decision paradigm with an IS1 of 200ms. A group of six age-matched control subjects showed robust priming for both category coordinates, 69ms; F1(1,5)=387, P < 0.001; F2(1,40)=63, P < 0.001, and functionally related items, 58ms; F1(1,5)=31, P < 0.01; F1(1,40)=33, P < 0.001, in this experiment. When we tested FM in December 1993, she showed a similar pattern with significant priming in both the category coordinate condition, 176ms; F1(1,35)= 10.8, P < 0.01, and in the functional condition, 1 1 1 ms; F2( 1,30) = 6.4, P < 0.05. However, when we tested her again in August, 1994, the pattern had changed. Although functionally related items continued to prime, 103ms, F2( 1,32) =9.2, P < 0.01, the effect for category was no longer significant, 63ms; F2(1,33) = 1.9, P > 0.1. Results for FM and the control group are shown in Table 4 . This suggests that during this period there has been some further degradation of representations in FM's semantic memory, such that category co-ordinate relations are no longer automatically activated, giving a pattern very similar to the one we observed for PP. In an explicit semantic-relatedness judgment task on the same pairs of items as used in the priming study, FM performed very poorly in all conditions, with a strong bias to respond positively to both related and unrelated trials. The data in Table 4 show that in the first time slice, FM's reaction times in the control conditions are rather slow compared to the control subjects, and that the size of the priming effect is also very large, especially for the category co-ordinates. However, in the second time slice, her reaction times are on the borders on the normal range, and the priming effect for functionally related items is no greater than for some control subjects. This pattern of change over time is consistent with some degree of loss of category information at the earlier time, resulting in hyper-priming, followed by further loss of category information over the subsequent months to the second testing period, by which time priming for category co-ordinates has ceased to be significant at all. This change for category co-ordinates is taking place while priming for functionally related information remains relatively stable. Close observation of the pattern of priming in future testing sessions is required to determine whether this is the correct interpretation.
To summarise, the results of the priming study for FM support those for PP, in suggesting relative preservation of functional properties rather than category structure in progressive aphasia. Theses studies also highlight the value of priming studies in revealing distinctions in performance that are not picked up in off-line tasks.
REPRESENTATION AND ACCESS OF ABSTRACT WORDS
Many patients with acquired language disorders have greater difficulty processing abstract words, such as truth, risk, and luck5 than concrete words such as table, building, and cut. Abstract words are those whose referents cannot be directly experienced through the senses. Patients have been reported who have problems with repeating abstract words (Franklin et al., 1994 ; Howard & Franklin, 1988) , understanding abstract words (Franklin, 1989; Franklin et al., 1994) , and perhaps most well known, with reading abstract words (Coltheart, Patterson, & Marshall, 1980) . Indeed, a greater difficulty in reading abstract than concrete words is seen as one of the key characteristics of deep dyslexia. There have been a few reports of patients who seem to have a greater difficulty for concrete words, either in reading (Wamngton, 1981) , or more generally (Breedin, Saffran, & Coslett, 1994 ; Warrington, 1975; Wanington & Shallice, 1984) , but this seems to be much rarer. What gives rise to the problem with abstract words for individual patients, and what is it about abstract words that seems to make them particularly vulnerable to disruption? These are important questions, as they may lead to identification of a fundamental distinction in semantic memory between the representation of abstract and concrete word meanings.
We have investigated knowledge of the meanings of concrete and abstract words for two aphasic patients in a series of semantic priming studies (Tyler, Ostrin, Cooke, & Moss, 1995; Tyler, Moss, & Jennings, in press ). DE and JG are both non-fluent (agrammatic) aphasics who have also been classified as deep dyslexic, and both have extensive left-hemisphere lesions (see Table 5 for patient details). Our question was whether their apparent difficulties with abstract words stemmed from a central loss of stored semantic information for abstract words, or whether it could be traced to impairments in accessing intact underlying semantic representations. Both kinds of account have been put forward to explain the deficit of different deep dyslexic patients (Shallice, 1988a) . In order to address this question, we have used priming tasks alongside a range of off-line procedures to tap into automatic and voluntary access of the words' semantic representations.
Our first test confirmed that both DE and JG clearly have greater difficulty in reading abstract than concrete words. For a matched set of 20 abstract and 20 concrete words, DE read 100% of the concrete words accurately, but only 55% of the abstract words, whereas JG read 90% of the concrete words correctly but only 45% of the abstract words. We then carried out a word-to-picture matching ' Abstractness is highly (negatively) correlated with the imageability of a word-in that highly abstract words are difficult to picture. Abstractness and imageability have often been used interchangeably and we do not attempt to distinguish between them here. a Although these tests were administered several years ago, the scores remain valid, because neither DE nor JG have shown any significant change in their language-processing profiles over the last 10 years.
study to determine whether the same problem with abstract words would be manifest when the input modality was auditory rather than visual, and a spoken response was not required. This is one of the standard ways to distinguish between a modality-specific access problem and a central semantic (storage) impairment. We used the word-to-picture matching task devised by Shallice and McGill (unpublished) , in which subjects are asked to indicate the picture corresponding to a word spoken by the experimenter, from an array of four alternatives. The test set includes 30 concrete and 30 abstract words. In this task, both DE and JG performed considerably more poorly on the abstract than concrete words (DE: concrete 3% errors, abstract 33% errors; JG: concrete 10% errors, abstract 50% errors). Although this seems to support the view that the deficit for abstract words is a central one, the picture is not so clear when we examine the range of performance by control subjects in this task. We tested six elderly control subjects who had a similar level of education to DE and JG (in that they left school at 16 years or earlier). Although the mean error rates were lower than for the patients (0.6% for concrete words and 21% errors for abstract words) some subjects found the abstract words very difficult: the range of error rates was 0-3.3% for concrete words but 10-33% for abstract words. This means that DE was actually within the normal range of performance for abstract words, and slightly above the range for concrete words. JG, on the other hand, made more errors than the controls on both sets of words. Thus it is not clear that either are showing a selective deficit for abstract words in this task, and therefore we cannot answer the question of whether the reading difficulty for abstract words reflects a semantic memory impairment or a modality-specific access deficit.
Therefore we designed an auditory semantic priming task to compare priming for abstract and concrete words for JG and DE. In an earlier set of studies we have found both patients show normal semantic priming in a lexical decision task for concrete nouns sharing various different kinds of semantic relation, including the category co-ordinate and functional relations described earlier in the study of PP (Ostrin & Tyler, 1993; Tyler, Ostrin, Cooke, & Moss, 1995) .6 Would DE and JG show similar normal priming for abstract words, or would they show a pattern of no priming, or hyper-priming suggesting damage to the underlying semantic representations?
We selected a set of 4 4 pairs of abstract words which were strongly semantically related according to rating pre-tests completed by a group of subjects from our subject pool. These were mostly near-synonyms such as courage-bravery and risk-danger, but also included a few antonyms such as forget-remember. As a control for low-level intra-lexical priming, we ensured that half of the pairs were strongly normatively associated (e.g. couragebravery) and that the other half were purely semantically related with no association in either forward or backward direction (e.g. doubt-suspicion). All of the words in the abstract condition had a concreteness rating of less than 3.5 on a scale of 1-7 (mean 2.9). A set of 44 near-synonym pairs of concrete words were also selected (concreteness ratings over 3.5, mean 4.9). Again, half of these were strongly associated (e.g. street-road) and half were not associated (e.g. stick-cane). Targets in the concrete and abstract conditions were matched for length and familiarity, and the strength of semantic relation to the prime (for further details see Tyler, Moss, & Jennings, in press) .
The priming task was paired auditory lexical decision with a 200ms interstimulus interval. Each target was preceded either by the related prime or an unrelated control word, and these were counterbalanced over two versions, carried out a month apart, to avoid repetition effects. The results for DE and JG are shown in Table 6 , alongside those for seven elderly control subjects.
Control subjects showed significant priming in all conditions, F1(1,6)=110.76, P < 0.001; F2(1,80)=74.9, P < 0.001. There was an interaction between priming and concreteness, with a tendency for a larger priming effect for concrete items (91ms) than for abstract items (52ms), F( 1,6) =4.9, P = 0.069; F2( 1,80) = 5.6, P < 0.0 (although the priming effect was robust for the abstract words by themselves). The degree of associative strength between prime and target had no effect on priming (F1 and F2 < 1).
JG and DE both performed the lexical decision task reasonably well. DE made errors on 13.6% of the real-word targets, and his reaction times were within the normal range (mean 937ms; normal range 799-992ms). JG made errors on 5.7% of the real-word targets and his overall reaction times were slightly faster than the normal range (mean 796ms). JG showed a significant priming effect of 127ms overall, F2(1,71)=50, P < 0.001. Like the control subjects he also showed more priming for concrete than abstract words; 176ms and 76ms respectively, F2(1,71)=7.5, P<O.Ol-although, again like the controls, the priming effect for the abstract words was still significant.
However, JG's pattern of priming did appear to differ from that of the control subjects in one striking way: there was significantly less priming for associated than non-associated word pairs, in both concrete and abstract conditions, F2(1,71)=5.8, P < 0.05. In our previous studies we have generally found an increase rather than a decrease in priming when associative strength is added to any kind of semantic relation; an effect we have called the associative boost (Moss, Ostrin, Tyler, & Marslen-Wilson, in press; Moss, Hare, Day, & Tyler, 1994) . However, in the present study, the group of elderly control subjects showed very little difference in the mean priming effects for pairs of words with and without association, in spite of the fact that young control subjects showed the expected significant associative boost for the same materials (Moss, Hare, Day, & Tyler, 1994) . We attribute this reduction in the associative boost for the older subject group to the fact that the association norms, from which we selected the stimulus pairs, were collected from a young population. It is possible that the associative relations among some words differ across the younger and older generations tested, such that the manipulation of associated and non-associated items in the experiment is not as accurate for the elderly control group (examples such as the change in association from glue-stick to glue-sniff are readily apparent). JG does not only show a lack of associative boost, he slows a marked reduction in priming for associated pairs. It is not, however, clear to what extent this is an abnormal effect. Although the mean priming effects for the elderly control group are similar for associated and nonassociated conditions, individual subjects differ considerably in the relative size of priming effect for the two conditions, ranging from an advantage of 88ms for associated items to an advantage of 63ms for non-associated items. Thus, although JG's reduction in priming for associated items (90 and 85ms in concrete and abstract conditions respectively) is outside the normal range, the general pattern of less priming for associated prime-target pairs is not as abnormal as it might first appear. The crucial point for our current purpose is that the effect of association for JG was identical for concrete and abstract words, and that even with this effect, there was still significant priming in all conditions.
DE also showed a significant priming effect, 105ms, F2( 157) = 11.5, P < 0.001. There were no other main effects or interactions. He showed robust priming for abstract words (1 13ms) as well as for concrete words (96ms). However, an examination of the priming effects in the associated and nonassociated conditions reveals a similar pattern to that of JG, with more priming for non-associated items than associated items in both concrete and abstract conditions (although not giving rise to a significant interaction). The reduction in priming for associated items in the abstract condition (23ms) was within the normal range, but the reduction of 143ms for the concrete condition was greater than that shown by any control subject. Thus, both JG and DE showed reliable priming effects for abstract words. Moreover, there was little evidence of hyper-priming effects to indicate damage to the underlying semantic representations. Neither JG nor DE showed a baseline reaction time for lexical decision that was longer than the control range for any condition, including the abstract word conditions. This is clearly not the pattern predicted if priming were based on degraded semantic representations giving rise to abnormally long reaction times in the baseline condition. The magnitude of priming effects for the two patients were generally at the top of or just above the range for control subjects, with one exception: JG's 218ms (23%) priming effect for the non-associated concrete items is well above the control range (I-14%). However, this does not indicate a hyper-priming effect, according to the Chertkow et al. (1989) account. This is because the large facilitation effect is caused by exceptionally fast RTs in the related condition rather than exceptionally slow reaction times in the unrelated condition (see Table 6 ).
We can also conclude from these results that the priming effects for DE and JG in the abstract word condition were not mediated by lexical-level associative links rather than relations within the semantic system. This is because significant priming was found for pairs of word that were semantically related, but shared no associative connection in forward or backward direction. In fact, both DE and JG were adversely affected by associative connections between prime and target, although it is not clear to what extent this differs from the normal pattern for the elderly control group (we return to this issue in the Discussion).
The priming data indicate that there is no selective deficit in the semantic representation of abstract words for DE and JG. They are both capable of accessing those representations rapidly and automatically in order to support semantic priming. As a follow-up to the priming study we have carried out a definition-generation task for a subset of the abstract and concrete words, in order to compare JG and DE's ability to automatically access the meanings of abstract words as demonstrated in the priming task, with their ability to access those meanings under voluntary control in an explicit, metalinguistic task. The word to be defined was read to the subject by the experimenter, so that auditory comprehension could be tapped. We needed to do this because the word-topicture matching task had not provided clear evidence as to the ability to access abstract words under voluntary control from an auditory input.
Asking someone to provide a definition of a word is an intuitively straightforward way of assessing their knowledge of the meaning of the word, although it is a highly metalinguistic task, requiring controlled access to semantic information and careful reflection on that information to produce a response. The advantage over the word-to-picture matching task is that it does not require a pictorial representation to be devised for abstract words which, almost by definition, are difficult to picture (this may have been an important factor in the difficulty of the task). On the other hand, it does require a spoken response from patients whose production is non-fluent; therefore we are interested solely in the semantic content of the definition, ignoring production style.
DE and JG were asked to give definitions for 22 of the abstract words from the priming experiment and 24 highly concrete words taken from this and earlier studies. The word to be defined was spoken by the experimenter in each case, and the patient gave a verbal definition which we recorded. A group of 11 elderly control subjects also completed the definition task. Control subjects read each word and wrote down a definition in a booklet. ' For both DE and JG, the ability to define abstract and concrete words was remarkably good. Both were able to give an adequate definition of all the concrete words. JG missed only one abstract word and DE only three. The definitions were such that it was clear that both patients had a good deal of knowledge about the meaning of the words and were able to access those meaning representations under the highly controlled, metalinguistic demands of the definition task. In general, DE and JG gave definitions that differed from those of control subjects in two main ways (1) they rarely gave a superordinate, although controls very often did, and (2) they generated more context-specific, personally relevant information about what the word meant to them, rather than general information. Importantly, however, these differences were the same for concrete and abstract words; there seemed to be no special difficulty with abstract word definitions. Examples of the definitions given by the controls and patients are shown in Table 7 .
We have compared the content of definitions for control subjects when they are asked to give written and spoken responses, and find no difference between the two versions of the task. in the garden, grows and big and cut it off and eat, I grow them the grandest, and the beautiful crown coat and smart uniform the meat and all that, all lovely and bubbly OK, but the dung is ughh! sleep and wake up the most highest in the land The ability to define abstract words reinforces the priming results in showing that the abstract word deficit for DE and JG is not one of damage to the underlying semantic representations of abstract words. It also shows that the problem is not a general one of voluntary access to those representations either, but rather it seems to be specific to visual input. We are now in the process of conducting the priming studies with materials presented in the visual modality to determine the nature of the reading deficit. Is there a general problem with accessing the semantic representations of abstract words from visual inputs, in which case we would expect little priming in the visual modality, in contrast to the normal priming in the auditory modality? Or is the problem caused by some aspect unique to the reading task? For example, Marcel and Patterson (1978) suggested that the difficulty arose from the need to have a conscious representation of the phonological form of the word for reading aloud. If this kind of account is correct, visual priming effects may be normal for abstract words in spite of the reading impairment.
What are the implications of this study for the representation of abstract words in semantic memory? Although many more studies need to be carried out, our current hypothesis is that the difficulty with abstract words often experienced after brain damage is not due to a selective damage of the representations of abstract words themselves, but is more likely to be the result of disruption of access processes for a particular modality of input. The consequences of such access impairments generally affect abstract words more severely than concrete words, because of the nature of abstract word representations in semantic memory. Several authors have suggested that representations of abstract words are less "rich" than those of concrete words, in that they are made up of fewer semantic predicates or features (Jones, 1985; Plaut & Shallice, 1993) , and also that there are less stable, context-independent correlations among the component features for abstract words (Plaut & Shallice, 1993) . Such claims are supported by the fact that subjects generate fewer predicates, and rate it more difficult to think of a context for abstract words (Jones, 1985; Schwanenflugel, Harnishfeger, & Stowe, 1988) .
Several studies have demonstrated that abstract words are more difficult to process for normal adult subjects (Schwanenflugel, 1992) . This difficulty was also confirmed across the range of tasks in our study for our elderly control subjects; they showed less priming, more errors in word-to-picture matching, and found it more difficult to define abstract than concrete words. A similar pattern was found in a semantic relatedness judgment task for the word pairs used in the priming task; some control subjects made up to 34% errors for the abstract word pairs compared to a maximum of 16% errors for concrete words. Given these indications that abstract words are more difficult to access in the normal system, then it is plausible that damage to access routines will cause greater problems for abstract words. Thus damage to the auditory access process may result in abstract word deafness as in DRB (Franklin et al., 1994) whereas problems in the visual access route may be the basis of the abstract word effect in deep dyslexia, as modelled in a connectionist network by Plaut and Shallice (1993) .
In spite of the plausibility of the claim that problems for abstract words for patients with language disorders are an exaggeration of the increased difficulty in processing abstract words in the normal system, there is one important challenge for this kind of account. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, there have been reports, albeit rare, of patients who seem to have a selective problem for concrete words rather than abstract words. This finding is clearly problematic. However, it is possible that such cases can be accounted for within the framework described here.
For example, Plaut and Shallice have shown how a specific deficit to concrete words can arise in the connectionist model in which they demonstrated the more common abstract word-reading problems of deep dyslexia. A deficit for concrete words resulted from lesioning the model at the level of semantic clean-up units, whose function is to facilitate the model in settling into a stable pattern corresponding to a known word meaning. This kind of lesion had a more detrimental effect for concrete words, because they have many more correlations among features, and so develop more effective clean-up routines during learning. For example, there is a strong correlation between having eyes, having ears, being alive and so on. Activation of just a few of these features would lead to strong activation of the correlated features via the clean-up units. These correlations are not present for abstract words, and thus there is little dependence on clean-up units (Plaut & Shallice, 1993) . Although this account is somewhat speculative, it demonstrates that a pattern of selective deficit for concrete words does not necessitate the claim that there are separate semantic-memory stores for concrete and abstract words. This account also makes the interesting and testable claim that although abstract word deficits result from disrupted access processes, concrete word deficits result from problems within the central semantic system. Thus if a patient has difficulty with concrete words, the problem should extend to all modalities.
Finally, we return to the associative interference effect on priming that was shown by both JG and DE. In both concrete and abstract word conditions, there was considerably greater priming for pairs of words that were semantically related but not associated according to association norms (e.g. doubt-suspicion, stick-cane) than for those that were semantically related and also strongly associated (e.g. courage-bravery, street-road). Although this pattern was shown by some of the control subjects to a lesser degree, it remains a possibility that this finding does reflect a real deficit for the patients. This interpretation is also supported by our previous experiments in which DE and JG failed to show an advantage for associated prime-target pairs for a set of concrete words, where the elderly control subjects were showing a consistent associative boost (Moss & Tyler, 1993; Tyler, Ostrin, Cooke, & Moss, 1995) .
One possibility we have investigated is that there has been a disruption at the level of intra-lexical links between associated words for DE and JG (while semantic connections remain intact). We tested this in a priming experiment in which we measured priming for pairs of words that are strongly associated but are not semantically related (e.g. pillar-society, elbow-grease). Control subjects show robust priming for such word pairs (66ms; range 24126ms). If DE and JG had an impairment at this level, we might expect them to show abnormal effects for these items. However, their priming effects were exactly the same as for control subjects (DE, 69ms; JG, 69ms) . This shows that any reduction in priming for semantically related words that are also associatively related is not caused by a disruption at the level of intra-lexical associative connections per se. If we continue to find a pattern of associative interference, above the normal range, it will be necessary to investigate this effect further.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The studies of category and functional information for PP, and of abstract word meanings for DE and JG, are two examples of how the priming task can be used, along with a range of other more traditional methods, to investigate the nature of semantic memory impairments. The unique contribution of the priming task is that it taps into automatic rather than controlled access to semantic information, thus helping us to discriminate between disorders of access and storage.
In the first study described, use of the priming task indicated a relative preservation of functional information compared to category information for a patient with semantic dementia, which had not been revealed in an extensive battery of off-line tasks. The loss of information from PP's semantic memory was, thus, not as complete as might have been thought, although she was clearly unable to access even functional information under voluntary control. The difference in priming between functional and category information suggests that there may be representational distinctions between these two types of information in semantic memory.
In the second study, the priming results indicated that there was no selective impairment of the semantic representations for abstract words in two non-fluent, deep dyslexic patients. This finding reinforced the results of the definition task in which JG and DE were able to define abstract words as well as concrete words. By using a range of different tasks we were able to rule out a "categoryspecific" semantic impairment for abstract words, and hypothesised that the problem was a disruption of the visual access route, which exaggerated the "normal" difficulty of processing abstract words.
In these two studies we have demonstrated how the theoretical and methodological objections to the semantic priming task can be addressed. On the theoretical level we have controlled for intra-lexical priming effects by contrasting semantically related word pairs that are highly associated with those that are non-associated, and we have distinguished between noflil, ,nd hyperpriming effects, in order to determine whether priming is supported by intact or partially degraded semantic representations. In the Introduction we suggested a second way of establishing that priming was based on intact semantic representations: to examine priming for a range of different targets for a prime word (e.g. cat-dog, cat-whiskers, cat-pet, cat-animal). Although we have not reported such an experiment here, a large-scale study of this kind with a group of patients with progressive aphasia is now under way.
In spite of the important results that we have already obtained with the semantic priming task, it is nevertheless the case that both of the studies described here are only the first stages of more extensive studies currently in progress. Both studies raise as many questions as they answer. For the study of semantic dementia, the pressing questions that have emerged are: Is the distinction between category and functional information one that is generally found in progressive semantic deficits, or is it specific to PP? What is the basis of the distinction in terms of representation? To what extent does the preserved functional knowledge rely on autobiographical knowledge? Our study of abstract word meanings raises a number of questions, such as: Is the problem for abstract words one of visual access or is it specific to the reading task? To what extent does the apparent effect of abstractness interact with the form class of the word? How can abstract words be understood by patients with extensive lefthemisphere lesions when studies of unimpaired subjects suggest that only concrete words can be processed in the right hemisphere? These are just a small sample of the issues that have been raised by our research to date. Many of these questions have become apparent only as a direct result of our findings from the various priming tasks we have carried out. In future work, the semantic priming task will have an equally vital part to play in answering these, and other, fundamental questions about the nature of semantic memory.
